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Abstract
A vast recent literature has stressed social fragmentation’s negative impact on the provision of
public goods. It has been established theoretically that social fragmentation engenders discord and
thereby undermines public goods provision. Empirical research has produced mixed results about
this relationship. On the one hand it rarely holds for all the goods and on another hand it appears
attenuated at the micro-level. Three points ought to be considered. First, the negative role attributed
to social fragmentation rests upon the actuality of a relationship between social antagonisms and
ethnic diversity. Yet, such an actuality is to be proved. Second, should such a relationship exist,
polarization indices would be more appropriate than the traditional fractionalization index used so
far in the literature. Third, theoretical works have set aside the possibility of ethnic patronage in
accessing public goods. Nevertheless, it is a central issue as patronage is common in developing
countries. In this event, a positive relationship could be found between social fragmentation and the
presence of public goods. This article aims at showing that such a positive relationship does exist,
at least in parts of India, as a consequence of caste patronage. It also shows that polarization is
irrelevant as social antagonisms do not seem to be an obstacle to the provision of public goods.
Keywords: Political Economy; Patronage; Public Goods; Collective Action; Inequality; Olson; Caste; India.
JEL H4; O1; O2
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1 Introduction
Public goods availability has become a central issue foe economic development and is a key concern of
many developing societies. For instance, as Banerjee et al. (2007) recall "The National Election Survey
in India, carried out by the Center for the study of Developing Societies in 1996, asks 10,000 voters an
open-ended question: "What are the three main problems people like you face today?" Poverty was the
most popular response [...] but public goods came in a close second. Nearly a fifth of all respondents
listed problems associated with different types of public amenities as their main problem". The hitch
is that developing societies that sorely feel the absence of public goods are also often highly socially
fragmented.
It has been established for some time, both theoretically and empirically, that social fragmentation
undermines public goods provision by hampering collective action. This negative impact may come
in three ways. First heterogenous societies often exhibit strong differences in preferences regarding
public goods characteristics and therefore encounter difficulties in voicing their claims to limited public
resources. Second, individuals may be reluctant to work with other groups’ members. The impact of
group heterogeneity on group participation has been analyzed by Alesina and Ferrara (2000). The third
issue arises from the fact that different groups may disagree on the sharing of the private benefits or on
the allocation of their effort, due to potential free riding. Moreover, they fail to implement cooperation
enforcement devices across groups. Banerjee et al. (2007) provide a theoretical framework for this
issue and discuss how community characteristics such as the presence of an influential group, group
size, cohesion and the distribution of benefits influence free riding 1. According to their analysis, group
inequality has ambiguous effects and can increase or decrease collective effort depending on the shape
of the effort cost function. However, Bardhan et al. (2007) take a more clear-cut stand by showing that
in some situations, inequality between groups increases efficiency in solving collective action problems.
This echoes the positive role that Olson (1965) attributed to inequality in collective action. In Olson’s
argument, should most of the benefits accrue to a small number of group members, they may be willing
to bear the full cost of providing public goods. As inequality is often associated with social fragmen-
tation, this argument points toward a positive role played by fragmentation on the provision of public
1The presence of devices aiming at promoting group cooperation is not taken into account here. As Banerjee et al. (2007)
put it "some of these devices have been shown to be empirically important in mitigating free rider problems in public goods
settings and our main reason for staying clear of them here is that strong enough coordination mechanisms can make almost
any group outcome implementable. We believe a micro-founded theory of such coordination is required to make this approach
interesting and sharpen its predictive power, and we are not aware of any such theory".
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goods, through increased inequality and provided that public goods benefits are privatized. This point
has been made by Alesina and Ferrara (2005). As they rightly point out "while pure public goods may
be lower in more fragmented communities, the amount of publicly provided "private" goods - especially
those that can be targeted to specific groups- may be larger. We can then have a positive correlation
between fragmentation and ethnically based patronage". Patronage is common in developing countries.
For instance, in India, on which this paper focuses, caste patronage is well evidenced in economic life
(see for instance Srinivas (1955); Platteau (1995)) as well as in Indian politics (Chandra (2004)).
Empirically, fractionalization’s negative impact on the level of public goods has first been brought out
by Alesina et al. (1999). Focussing on US county, metro and city data, they found that more fragmented
cities spend proportionally less on schooling, roads, and trash pickups but more on health and police.
Interestingly, it may be argued that the last two goods are not independent from income in the United
States, thereby suggesting that public goods may benefit from fractionalization provided that individual
income comes in the equation.
As Banerjee and Somanathan (2001) point out, the authors use data for public goods that are contem-
poraneous to the fractionalization data, and given the high mobility environment of US cities, the analysis
may be flawed with reverse causality due to a sorting effect analyzed by Tiebout (1956). Following their
seminal work, other authors have tried to firmly establish the link between fractionalization and collec-
tive action or public goods. Miguel and Gugerty (2005) also found a negative relationship between ethnic
fractionalization and school funding and infrastructure in Kenya. One caveat to their work is that it may
not be immune from Tiebout’s sorting as well, although the authors use different specifications to address
this issue. Banerjee and Somanathan (2001) have tried to tackle the issue of reverse causality by using
caste fragmentation data from the 1931 census to explain the provision of public goods in the 1970s and
the 1980s, which makes sense given the low level of mobility in rural India. Regressing the proportion
of villages in districts having access to a particular good, they found fractionalization had a negative
impact on nearly half of the selected public goods, while it had a positive significant effect for 10% of
them. Interestingly, the authors admit that the fragmentation measure may be a proxy for inequality and
that the relatively rich can be effective in getting goods to their village. In a similar analysis, Banerjee
et al. (2005) found that caste fragmentation has a significant negative impact on 10 out of 26 public
goods and a positive significant impact on 3, thus providing more mixed results about the relationship.
Moreover, Somanathan et al. (2006) found that caste heterogeneity had no impact on collective action
regarding the preservation of a common forest in the Indian Himalayas. The detrimental role of social
fragmentation in the provision of public goods is not definite, as evidenced by this short literature review.
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Most of the empirical work has, so far, been conducted on a rather aggregate level and has primar-
ily been concerned with the level of public goods. Micro data may bring out a different story. Indeed,
little has been said on how these public resources and their usage are allocated across villages and even
less across households. If fragmentation is a proxy for the presence of wealthy individuals who enjoy
the political leverage to bring the needed goods to their villages, and who reap sufficient benefits from
them to disregard free riding costs, fragmentation may prove beneficial to the provision of public goods.
Similarly, the presence of caste patronage may prompt a positive relationship between social fragmenta-
tion and the presence of public goods. Informative micro analyses are those of Dayton-Johnson (2000),
Bardhan (2000) and Khwaja (2009)and Anderson (2007). Their results, however, should be handled
with care due to data scarcity. Looking at 48 irrigation systems and maintenance indicators in Mexico,
Dayton-Johnson (2000) found that social heterogeneity has both a direct negative effect by lowering co-
operative effort and a positive indirect one by making a group less likely to select the poorly performing
allocation rule, so that its indirect effect on cooperation is positive. Economic inequality is found to
lower cooperative effort, although its impact is U-shaped. Besides, economic inequality has an indirect
effect on cooperation via its effect on the choice of the distributive rule. Bardhan (2000) found similar
results looking at 48 irrigation systems maintenance in South India villages. The social homogeneity
variable is hardly found significant, while inequality is found to have a significant U-shaped impact al-
though it is twofold. On the one hand, inequality’s direct effect is negative, while on the other hand, the
indirect effect, working through the cost sharing rule is positive. Another interesting point, is that better
off farmers tend to violate water allocations rules crafted by others and respect those defined by the elite.
This suggests that the latter holds public resources access in a strong grip. For instance, Anderson (2007)
showed how higher castes control the access to irrigation systems and are unwilling to sell water to lower
castes. Khwaja (2009) also found a U-shaped effect of land inequality on projects maintenance in rural
communities in Pakistan, although fragmentation’s negative coefficient remained significant.
Micro data analysis do not help drawing a clearer picture of fragmentation’s detrimental role to the
provision of public goods, although they stressed the close link that it has with inequality and the dis-
tributive rule. They clearly emphasize that high levels of inequality do raise the likelihood of successful
collective action through the definition of the allocation rule, which is often designed by better off in-
dividuals. One of the reasons may be found in Olson’s argument, as discussed above. These analysis
show how wealthy individuals have sufficiently high stakes in public goods to bear a large part of their
provision costs and how they restrict their access to their peers.
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This article aims at testing at a micro level the theoretical prediction according to which fragmen-
tation may have a positive impact on the provision of public goods as castes elite would accommodate
their caste members with access to the goods. Such a result would have strong implications in developing
economies since universal access to public goods is key to development. It would emphasize the fact that
one should not only look at the presence of public goods but also at the use that is made of them. The
analysis is run using data collected in the Indian states of Uttar Pradesh and Bihar aggregated at village,
hamlet and household levels. Section 2 presents the data, section 3 sets out the empirical strategy, while
results are discussed in section 4. Section 5 concludes.
2 Data
The analysis is based on data collected in 1997-1998 by the World Bank in a Survey of Living Conditions
in the Indian states of Uttar Pradesh and Bihar. The data cover 2,250 households spread across 342
neighborhoods or "tolas" in 120 villages in 25 districts. These two states form most of what has been
referred to as India’s poverty belt and caste relationships in this region are known to be confrontational,
to put it mildly. For instance, in 1998 more than one fourth of hate crimes committed against scheduled
castes in India were perpetrated in these 2 states alone2. In this section, we discuss the choice of the
variables that are used in the empirical analysis as well as basic data.
2.1 Communities
Indian society has long been divided along two lines: caste and religion. Caste has long been and
remains a rich field of investigation for anthropologists and sociologists, since it is a rare example of
institutionalized hierarchical social fragmentation that has been ruling Indian everyday life for more than
3,000 years. Stringent caste specific rules govern, not to say limit, groups interactions. Restrictions are
particularly strong in the field of marriage and commensality, but are not confined to these domains.
Caste also includes a hierarchical feature that assigns every individual its place in the social ladder
and thus impacts potential inter-group cooperation. Since the 1949 Indian constitution outlawed caste
based discrimination and untouchability, a reservation policy has been set up for lower castes, thereby
increasing inter-castes tensions as anti-reservation protests have shown. The number of castes, or "jatis"
are estimated at 4,700, although due to the reservation policy, the Census of India groups them into 4
broad categories: the higher segment of society or forward castes (26% of the population), backward
castes (52%), and outcasts such as dalits, labeled scheduled castes ("SC" 16% of the population) and
2source: India Ministry of Home Affairs, National Crime Records Bureau
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tribes labeled scheduled tribes ("ST" 7%). The two last categories represent the weaker segment of
society. A similar classification is used in our data where castes have been coded as "UP", "MID",
backward agricultural caste ("BAC"), other backward agricultural castes ("OBC"), and scheduled castes
("SC"). In our sample, these groups account respectively for 15%, 3%, 30%, 22% and 31% of the Hindu
population. It is worth noticing that this classification probably underestimates actual fragmentation.
Indeed, it encompasses very different situations as Brahmins’ prestige may be very different from another
less well regarded caste, although both are labeled "forward caste".
While caste is clear-cut and a well established institution among Hindus, it is also a reality among other
religious groups, although not in the same plain way. Muslims and Christians seem to have inherited
from their Hindu ancestors’ castes. In our sample, muslims are classified into upper castes (37.4% of
the muslim population) and lower castes (62.6%). Two features of the caste system are of particular
interest to our study, since they help at brushing aside the reverse causality issue associated with the
fractionalization measure:
• caste membership is determined by birth and individual upward social mobility is ruled out
• social mobility of a caste as a group is fairly limited and may only occur over generations
Another social fragmentation factor is religion. India is reputed for its baffling religious diversity. Hindus
represents 80.5% of the population. Muslims come as the second largest community with 138M mem-
bers (13.4%) followed by Christians (2.3%) and Sikhs (1.9%). In the states of Uttar Pradesh and Bihar
on which our analysis focuses, Hindus account for respectively 80.6% and 83.2% of the population while
the rest of the population is muslim. In our sample, 90% of the households are Hindus and 10% muslims.
Religion is an important factor of social division in India and is becoming increasingly so, as the riots
that took place in the state of Gujarat in 2002 and its thousands of deaths have testified.
2.2 fractionalization and polarization measures
Social fragmentation has long been approached through the fractionalization index calculated as follows:
Frac = 1−
n∑
1
pii
2
where pii is the population’s share of the ith group or caste, assuming that the population is split into n
groups. The use of this index to test the relationship between social fragmentation and the provision of
public goods rests upon the idea that social diversity induces a lack of cooperation or antagonisms which,
in turn, hamper the provision of public goods through mechanisms exposed in the first section. Yet, the
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relationship between social diversity and conflict has not been firmly established. As Esteban and Ray
(2008) summarize "By and large, it is fair to say that most of the literature fails to find any significant
evidence of ethnic fractionalization as a determinant of conflict". According to Montalvo and Reynal-
Querol (2005) the lack of explanatory power of ethnic heterogeneity on the incidence of conflict can be
attributed to the inadequacy of the fractionalization index to capture social antagonisms. Indeed, the frac-
tionalization index is largely influenced by the number of groups identified as it measures the probability
that two randomly chosen individuals belong to the same ethnic group. It is a measure of diversity that
does poorly at reflecting potential antagonisms. A richer framework would be the one designed by Este-
ban and Ray (1994) where the concept of polarization is defined as the sum of interpersonal antagonisms
that can arise from
• a sense of group identification: individuals feel more closely tied to their groups when they are
relatively large. This is captured by the parameter α ∈ [0; 1.6] As such, polarization puts the
emphasis on the population frequency in each group.
• a sense of alienation with respect to other groups materialized by intergroup distances, noted bij .
The polarization index as defined in Esteban and Ray (1994) could be written as follows:
PER = P (α, b) = K
n∑
1
∑
j 6=i
pi1+αi pijbij
where pii is the population’s share of the ith group and K > 0. The index depends on parameter K
which is used for population normalization. Please note that for α=0, PER is extremely close to an
intergroup Gini coefficient3. The larger α the further away the polarization measure moves from the Gini
coefficient.
PER was initially designed as a measure of wealth or income polarization. As such it is difficult to
implement since the indicator strongly depends on the identification and the selection of economic groups
which may be arbitrary and by all means far from obvious. For computational simplicity, Montalvo and
Reynal-Querol (2002) have derived a special class of polarization index where bij = bi = 1. Polarization
indices as defined in Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2002) could thus be written
PRQ = P (α, 1) =
n∑
1
pi1+αi pij
Please note that for α = 0, PRQ = Frac and the larger α the weaker the correlation between the
fractonalization index and the polarization measures. The correlation may even turn negative for large
values of α. The parameter α may be understood as the polarization sensitivity.
3The difference between the two indices stems from the K parameter
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Although the convenience of such an index is not to be proved, one reservation has to be expressed:
it totally irons out the fact that intergroup relationships are strongly influenced by inequality in economic
outcomes. We would argue, although this is not the subject at hand, that caste identity, albeit defined
by birth, is highly dependent upon caste relative wealth. Since wealth is highly correlated with caste
membership we would propose in accordance with Esteban and Ray (1994) the following polarization
index
P ∗ =
n∑
1
∑
j 6=i
pi1+αi pij |yi − yj |
where yi is the mean wealth of the ith caste divided by the population’s mean wealth4.
In order to test the relationship between social fractionalization and the presence of public goods,
PRQ and P ∗ will be alternatively introduced as explanatory variables for three values of α = [0; 0.8; 1.6].
It should be kept in mind that the larger α the more emphasis is put on potential antagonisms. The impact
of the polarization index would be expected to increase with α. Besides, should the impact of PRQ differ
from P ∗, conclusions may be drawn about the importance of intergroup inequality.
Please note that our sample is highly fractionalized since our fractionalization index ranges from 0
to 0.8 with a mean of 0.61 and a standard deviation of 0.16. As a comparison, the index value reported
by Alesina et al. (1999) in the US ranges from 0.02 to 0.61 with a mean of 0.26 and a standard deviation
of 0.14 5.
2.3 Selected Public Goods
Social fragmentation impacts the level of public goods provision since it hinders collective action. How-
ever, the canal through which the lack of collective action negatively impacts access to public goods has
never been made quite clear. On the one hand, the absence of collective action prevents from making
a clear case for goods provision to authorities via the political route. On the other hand, it also hinders
populations from pooling resources to have the goods built by communities. One of the reasons why the
route has never been designed very explicitly is that researchers have tended to test all kinds of goods
without clearly distinguishing between those that require a political decision and hence a clear petition
from all communities and those that can be produced locally. For instance, in India, a village wishing to
connect to the electrical network needs to voice its demand at the district level and require approval from
officials. On the other hand, paving a road to gain access to a village is of municipal competence. Goods
4Table 7 displayed in the annexes set out the correlation matrix across the polarization measures
5The index based on the 1971 Census of India reported by Banerjee and Somanathan (2007) at a district level ranges from
0.2 to nearly 1 and has a mean of 0.9
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to be tested in our analysis belong to the two categories. We have tested for the presence of primary and
middle schools as well as that of electricity, phone connection and of an anganwadi center (i.e. child
development center). We have also included facilities that may be produced locally such as the presence
of a waste disposal system which in our case takes the form of an open drain, as well as the presence of
paved roads leading to the village and of a bus station. Should the impact of fractionalization differ in
these two categories we may be able to draw conclusions on the canal through which a lack of collective
action generates a lower level of public goods.
The government autonomy in implementing public goods should not be overlooked. This is what
Banerjee et al. (2007) called the top down approach. For instance, the Indian state has made an important
commitment to public goods provision. As Banerjee et al. (2007) remind "in 1968, the ruling Congress
Party brought out the National Policy on Education, which made a commitment to universal primary
education. The Minimum Needs Program of 1974-75 set down explicit norms about access to public
goods in rural areas [...] Indira Gandhi made the removal of poverty (Garibi Hatao) the cornerstone of
her successful election campaign in 1971". Since these campaigns had been on for more than 20 years up
to 1997-98 when the data were collected, governments had time to make those goods available across the
country, irrespective of village characteristics. This may be especially true of education, as the spread
of educational facilities has long been a priority of many governments. Indeed in our sample, 94 out
of the 120 villages had primary public schools. In villages without a public primary school, more than
half households have access to it within less than 1km. However, as discussed earlier the production
of some other public goods relies much more heavily on local initiative, especially so since the 1992
act that empowered local governments. To sum up, public goods may be classified along two lines: (a)
those whose production brings third parties into play versus those whose production rests solely on local
initiative and (b) those that have long been the target of poverty removal programs.
2.4 Wealth inequality
There are three reasons to control for economic inequality. First, fractionalization may be a proxy for
inequality as the two are often correlated. Second, as the discussion on the polarization measures has
brought to light, inequality may sharpen social divides and amplify existing antagonisms. This effect
should be captured by the P ∗ index.
Third, wealth inequality may play a positive role of its own on the provision of public goods in two
ways. First, wealthy individuals tend to have enough political leverage to bring public goods to their
village. They may be the ones benefiting most from public goods and therefore they may be willing to
undertake the cost of being free ridden. This is the Olson effect. For instance Foster and Rosenzweig
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(1995) have found that the wealthier farmers are sooner ready to adopt high yielding varieties and thus
create a knowledge about this new agricultural technology. The other farmers have freely benefited from
this knowledge and have started adopting these varieties as well. Khwaja (2009) found a U-shaped rela-
tionship between wealth inequality and the maintenance of public goods by examining village level data
in Pakistan. According to his findings, a small increase in inequality leads to lower levels of maintenance
while stark inequality is often associated with better maintenance. Second, inequality within caste may
be associated with caste patronage as the rich are in charge of making the publicly provided goods avail-
able to their communities members. In this event, we would expect fractionalization to have a positive
impact on the provision of public goods and access to the latter to be somewhat restricted to specific
dominant groups.
Wealth concentration is quite significant in our sample. On average, the largest landowner owns 31%
of the village’s lands, ranging from 0.14% to 0.92% with a standard deviation of 0.15. In villages where
land is most equally distributed land value ranges from 0.4MRs to 0.9MRs, while in villages exhibiting
the most unequal distribution, it ranges from 5,800Rs to 14MRs. The individual Gini coefficient ranges
from 0.3 to 0.88 with a mean of 0.54 and a standard deviation of 0.11. Please note that the largest land
owners are the upper castes in 45% villages of the sample, backward agricultural castes in 31%, muslims
in 13%, Other backward castes in 8%, scheduled castes and tribes in 3%.
Drawing on both Olson’s argument and on the possible occurrence of patronage, we are in a po-
sition to say that fractionalization may have a positive impact on the provision of public goods as the
fractionalization index is (a) dependent on the number of groups that may engage in patronage activities
(b)often associated with greater inequality and hence the presence of wealthy individuals who are willing
to undertake the cost of bringing a public good to their villages . These are the two routes we propose to
examine in our empirical strategy.
3 Empirical Strategy
Our analysis comes in three steps. First, we want to establish the relationship between the fractional-
ization/polarization indices and the presence of public goods such as schools, electricity, telephone, etc.
A probit model is used for each public good and is detailed in the next paragraph. Secondly, we want
to investigate whether this relationship is linked to the impact of wealth inequality on the provision of
public goods. Although the P ∗ measure of polarization will provide some hints, we will include four
different measures of wealth inequality that are detailed in a subsequent section. These estimations are
referred to as the fractionalization / polarization model. Finally, in order to establish that the positive
10
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relationship is due to patronage we use a probit model to assess wether caste membership has any in-
fluence on households’ access to the public good, and whether this influence depends on which caste is
dominant in the village. These estimations are referred to as the patronage model. All the models are
detailed in the following sections.
3.1 Specifications of the fractionalization model
The model is a probit regression and is specified in a rather standard form. The likelihood of village i to
have the public good j is:
Pr(Yi,j = 1) = F (αPi + βpii + γσi) (1)
where F is the standard normal c.d.f. and Pi are the various polarization measures as per 2.2.for the
different values of α = [0; 0.8; 1.6]. Please recall that PRQ comes down to the standard fractionalization
index for α = 0. pii is a set of village population characteristics such as average income, the number
and average size of households and the percentage of households whose primary source of living is their
own farm. The first three population characteristics are expected to have a positive impact as public
goods providers, such as utilities companies for instance, are more willing to service an area packed
with potential solvent users. However, one may argue that larger groups encounter greater difficulties in
coordinating collective action. Our intuition is that the positive population size effect will outweigh a
potential negative one, as the impact of group size on collective action has not been evidenced or made
plain and clear. We have also included a variable that represents the percentage of households whose
primary source of livelihood is their own farm, to proxy urbanization level of the village. We expect this
variable to have a negative impact on the provision of public goods. Finally, σi represents the number of
third parties interventions such as government or NGO programs in the village. This variable is included
in order to account for the institutions’ autonomy in deciding to provide public goods as discussed in the
selected public goods section. Please note that neither the number of programs nor the average or total
money allocated are significantly correlated with fractionalization. In order to make the interpretation
easier, the list of the variables used is provided in appendix as well as their summary statistics.
3.2 Measures of wealth inequality
As already mentioned, wealth inequality should be controlled for as (a) we need to ensure that economic
inequality is not the relevant variable that fractionalization and / or polarization would proxy and (b) we
want to determine if inequality plays a specific role and which form of inequality is the most relevant.
To do so, three indicators of inequality will be included in (1) depending on the polarization measure
11
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considered. As discussed, intergroup inequality is already accounted for in the polarization indices P ∗
but not within group inequality. PRQ does not account for any kind of inequality. This last measure will
have to be introduced together with a Theil ratio and its decomposition, calculated following Deshpande
(2000). Assume individuals are grouped into n mutually exclusive groups, g1, ..., gn , each with mj
individuals. Define yj and pij as group’s j average wealth based on land value and population’s share
respectively and y as the population’s average wealth. Let’s write Rj =
yj
y . Then between group
inequality can be expressed as:
bgi =
n∑
j=1
pijRj logRj
and within group inequality as
wgi =
n∑
j=1
pijRjTj
with for every individual i belonging to group gj i.e. i ∈ gj
Tj ≡ 1mj
∑
i∈gj
ri log ri
where ri is the ratio of individual wealth to mean wealth for group j. Overall inequality can then be
written
Theil = bgi+ wgi
This decomposition of the overall inequality into between group and within group inequality will prove
very useful as it will allow us to control solely for intragroup inequality when the polarization measure
does already include information about the intergroup wealth distribution as it is the case with P ∗. We
would also be in a position to identify not only whether inequality plays a significant role of its own but
also which form of inequality prevails.
In the event of patronage, we would expect inequality within caste to play a positive role on the
public goods provision, while inter-caste inequality would not be significant. Indeed, rich caste members
would act as patron by endowing their poorer communities members with access to the public goods as
caste solidarity would command as well as in exchange for social prestige. A lower level of intragroup
inequality would limit the scope for patronage activity.
The third and last inequality measure to be introduced in (1) is denoted rich and is calculated as the
largest land value owned by the wealthiest household in the village divided by the average land values
owned by the other households. Formally, for N households each owning a value yi of land:
rich = maxi∈N [yi]× N−1N∑
i=1
yi−maxi∈N [yi]
12
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This variable captures the upper hand of the distribution that is the presence of very wealthy individuals
and is therefore useful to detect the Olson’s effect contrary to the Theil index that reflects the overall
distribution. In order to control for the rest of the distribution the rich variable is included in (1) together
with a Theil ration calculated over the distribution excluding the wealthiest individuals.
3.3 Specifications of the patronage model
We now turn to investigating the presence of patronage. We want to examine whether caste membership
has an impact on having access to a specific public good provided the good is available in the village
and whether this impact depends on what caste is dominant. For instance, we will assess whether a BAC
household has significantly more access to the goods if it lives in a village where the BAC caste is the
largest land owner. Let’s note the main variables as follows
• P (Yh,j) the likelihood for household h to have access to good j.
• Lh is the value of the land owned by household h
• Ch is a vector of dummies accounting for the household’s caste membership
• Di is a vector of dummies for the dominant caste c in village i where household h lives. A
dominant caste is the caste that owns the largest share of land within the village.
• Xhk represent a vector of observations for household h on k variables such as literacy and age of
the household’s head and size of the household h.
The equation to be estimated is therefore
Pr(Yh,j = 1) = F (βkXh;k + α1Lh + δcDi;c + γ1Ch + γ2(Ch ×Di;c) (2)
+α2(Lh ×Di;c) + α3(Lh × Ch) + α4(Lh × Ch ×Di;c))
where F is a standard normal c.d.f. In a first step the distance to the public good coded as a dummy
equals to 1 if the household lives less than 500m away from the good will be the dependent variable.
In a second step household’s access will be the dependent variable. P (Yh,j) will be the likelihood for
household h for instance to have electricity available at home when the village is electrified, or to send
children to schools when children of schooling age are present or to have toilets when a waste disposal
system is available in the village.
By comparing coefficients γ1 and γ2 we could see whether being of the same caste as the dominant one
does raise the likelihood of having access to the public good. Such an event would plead for patronage.
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However, there could be a more indirect way to favor members of its own caste. Suppose that being
wealthy has a positive significant impact on affording domestic electricity except when the household
is of the same caste as the dominant one. This would be an indirect form of patronage. By comparing
coefficients α1, α2 and α3 we should be in a position to see whether the impact of wealth on having
access to the good depends on the dominant caste and/or on the household’s caste. By weighing these
coefficients against α4 we should see if wealth has a different impact depending on whether the household
belongs to the same caste as the dominant one. Should such a scenario occurs, we would conclude as
well to patronage.
3.4 Identification issues
3.4.1 Reverse causality
Many empirical works on the impact of fractionalization on the provision of public goods have been
disturbed by a reverse causality issue evidenced by Tiebout (1956). First, let’s recall that one of the
premises for the negative impact of fractionalization on collective action is preferences’ heterogeneity.
According to Tiebout’s model, individuals sort themselves to neighborhoods that provide them with the
mostly desired public goods thereby homogenizing the neighborhoods. For instance, the poor may con-
verge to areas that provide services valued by the poor. Together with Miguel and Gugerty (2005) and
Banerjee and Somanathan (2007) we believe that this issue is not so manifest in developing countries.
Indeed, Tiebout’s model rests on the assumptions of perfect mobility and information, which are seldom
found in developing countries. Unfortunately our data do not provide direct information on migrations.
However, as Rosenzweig and Stark (1987) have shown, migrations in India are dominated by women for
the purpose of marriage and their mobility helps in mitigating households’ income risks and in smoothing
consumption. The 2001 Census of India indicates that in the states of Uttar Pradesh and Bihar, 81% and
89% of migrants are women out of which 82% and 87% migrate for marriage purposes, thereby confirm-
ing that Tiebout’s sorting may not play a significant role, at least in this part of India. Besides, as noted
earlier, caste membership comes by birth and individual mobility is ruled out while collective mobility
may only occur over generations.
3.4.2 Substitution
Banerjee and Somanathan (2001) and Banerjee and Somanathan (2007) brought out the issue of substi-
tution across public goods. "Neglected populations may not get less of every public good - they may
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simply be given less valuable goods. Villages without access to a hospital may receive some type of
less elaborated health facility for reasons of equity or as part of a political mechanism aimed at pacifying
them". Two reasons lead to believe that substitution is not much of an issue in the analysis: (a) we use the
presence of a particular public good in villages rather than budget shares and (b) selected public goods
do not provide the same kind of services. It would make little sense to assume which public good is
superior to the other, or if electricity should be preferred to schools. Banerjee and Somanathan (2001)
have tried to address this issue by exploiting the fact that scheduled tribes are weak political groups and
as such are unlikely to get the much coveted goods. Therefore, the goods for which the scheduled tribe
coefficient is significantly positive may be assumed to be the less coveted goods. Unfortunately, we are
not able to resort to this method as scheduled tribes are absent from the sample and scheduled castes can
not play this role as they are increasingly becoming politically strong.
3.4.3 Omitted variables
It is very likely that different groups will want different goods. Brahmins for example may be very keen
on having schools due to their traditional role as knowledge depositories, while traders will be more
attached to roads. In this case, the heterogeneity measure would pick up the changes in the population’s
shares of the different groups. To control for this effect, we include the share of scheduled castes in
equation (1) as a robustness check, although we are forced to recognize that this is quite a rough mea-
sure. We also include as a robustness check a variable that captures the fact that either the upper or the
bac castes own the largest share of land and are therefore "dominant". Possible other omitted variables
include topography measures, for it is much harder to build paved roads in a mountainous environment.
Unfortunately, such data are unavailable and the number of village points (120) prevents us from in-
cluding district fixed effects. However, as a robustness check a state dummy has been included in the
estimation of equation (1). 6. However, urbanization is proxied by the percentage of households whose
primary source of income is their own farm.
6All these robustness checks are presented in tables 8, 9 and 10 in the appendix
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4 Results
4.1 The Fractionalization / Polarization Model
Results from estimating equation (1) with the fractionalization index are presented in the table 1 of the ap-
pendix7. Fractionalization’s coefficients are all positive except for the presence of public primary school,
even though they are not significant for the presence of bus station, electricity and middle schools. As
it will be shown later access to public primary schools is rather universal and relatively exempt from
patronage since neither the household’s wealth nor caste does influence access to public primary school.
Besides, 20 years of poverty removal and education programs have made public primary schools widely
accessible. On the other hand, as far as the other goods are concerned, some sort of patronage activities
seem to be taking place. We would argue that this is the reason why coefficients for all the goods but
public primary schools are positive.
Please note that the number of sponsored programs does significantly impact the presence of telephone,
electricity and middle school, while the fractionalization index exhibit non significant coefficients for
these last two goods. This suggests that social fragmentation may have no impact due to the fact that
electricity and middle schools are targeted goods of poverty removal programs. Please note that neither
the addition of the percentage of scheduled castes in the village nor the inclusion of the dominant caste
variable has changed the results as table 8 and 9 show. Similarly, the inclusion of a state fixed effect has
only slightly modified the coefficient for public primary school. Its p-value moved from 7.6% to 10.7%.
The results obtained from estimating equation (1) are relatively robust to these changes.
The positive sign associated to the fractionalization coefficients is rather unexpected as theoretical
as well as previous empirical works have evidenced a negative sign. Supposedly, fractionalization in-
duces antagonisms that prevent communities to reach an agreement. If such a mechanism is at work, the
stronger the polarization’s degree the larger its negative impact on the provision of public goods. Table
2 exhibits the coefficients obtained by estimating equation (1) and by replacing the fractionalization’s
index by the two types of polarization defined above by PRQ and P ∗. Looking at the polarization index
when intergroup inequality is not taken into account that is for PRQ, two points should be made. First,
as the index moves away from the fractionalization index towards a polarization measure,the coefficients
lose significance, although they remain positive for an intermediate level of α. Second, for high levels of
polarization coefficients become negative for 4 goods. Hence, the larger the emphasis is put on potential
7In order to save space and to make interpreting the results less cumbersome, control variables will not be set out in the
other tables. Full tables are available upon request
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antagonisms, the less significant is this measure. This points towards the idea that intergroup potential
antagonisms play a very little role if any.
Coefficients related to P ∗ for α = 0 suggest that intergroup inequality plays no significant role in
the provision of public goods except for anganwadi centers. For very high levels of group identification,
(i.e. for α large and stark polarization), polarization’s coefficients exhibit a negative sign, although it is
only significant for the presence of a waste disposal system. We would argue that P ∗ more accurately
reflects potential antagonisms and the negative signs associated with the index coefficients are in line
with theoretical predictions although evidence suggest that potential antagonisms are not significantly
part of the story, nor is intergroup inequality.
4.2 Inclusion of the Wealth Inequality Measures
This last assertion is strengthened by the results presented in table 3A, where PRQ has been introduced
in equation (1) together with the Theil index. Please keep in mind that the Theil index is a measure of
general inequality as it encompasses both within group inequality and between group inequality. The
polarization coefficients have been little changed by this inclusion except for the presence of telephone
connections for which coefficients lose significance although they remain close to the 10% level of sig-
nificance. General inequality is not found to significantly impact the presence of public goods except
for that of electricity and phone connections. Interestingly for these two last goods a higher degree of
inequality is associated with an increase in the probability of having access to the goods. Tables 3B
set out the results from similar estimations except that PRQ is replaced by P ∗. Again, results are not
changed by the addition of the Theil index.
As mentioned, the Theil index is a measure of general inequality. It may be of some interest to break
it out into between group and within group inequality. Tables 4 present the results from the estimating
(1) when the polarization indices are entered together with these two measures of inequality . Please
note that P ∗ is entered only together with the intra group index given that this polarization measures do
already include a dimension of intergroup inequality. 8. The first point to be made is that the inclusion of
the two inequality measures has not altered the significance of the polarization coefficients except for the
presence of phone connections. Second, coefficients signs have turned negative only for the presence of
8Correlation coefficients between the between group inequality index and the polarization indices are 0.9, 0.7 and 0.5 for
the respective values of α =[0;0.8;1.6]
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bus stations and middle schools. Interestingly, the goods for which polarization coefficients are negative
are also the ones for which between group inequality coefficients are significant or close to significance.
This could be a step in showing that fractionalization negatively impacts the presence of public goods
when there actually is intergroup inequality and as a consequence potential group antagonisms. How-
ever, only low to medium levels of polarization seem to be detrimental to the presence of schools while
intergroup inequality is beneficial. Again, this suggests that potential antagonisms arising from higher
inequality are not part of the explanation of the negative impact of social fractionalization. Rather this
negative impacts has to do with the number of groups within a society given that only the fractional-
ization’s coefficients are significant and not the polarization ones. This points more towards explaining
fractionalization negative impact by a coordination failure. Yet, these remarks solely apply to three goods
out of eight. For the other goods, fractionalization’s coefficients remain positive. It should be noted that
within group inequality is found to have a significant or nearly significant impact on the presence of
telephone, electricity, anganwadi centers and public primary schools. These impacts are positive except
for the presence of anganwadi centers. It should be kept in mind that anganwadi centers were part of
government programs designed to fight infant malnutrition and mortality. As such they are more oriented
towards lower castes and tribes as well as deprived populations. Therefore, they are mostly implemented
in poor areas where inequality is not so strong.
The positive role played by inequality be it inter or intra-group is rather quaint. There are two hy-
potheses that could be brought forward and that we wish to investigate. First, the presence of patronage
that we will explore a a little later. Second, we wish to check for the presence of an Olson’s effect and
we do so by including the variable rich described in section 3.2. together with a Theil index calculated
over the rest of the distribution. Table 5 displays the results from the estimation. This specification yields
the same results as in tables 4, as far as the polarization coefficients are concerned. The variable rich
exhibit a positive significant or close to significance coefficient for 4 goods and a negative significant one
for waste disposal. The richer the wealthiest landowner, the more likely is the good to be present at the
village level, all else being equal. This result does support the occurrence of the Olson’s effect.
To sum up, only low levels of polarization have a significant positive impact on the presence of
public goods provided the measure does not stress intergroup distance. These results go against the
idea that larger social fragmentation generate larger antagonisms that prevent the villages from having
the public goods as (a) fractionalization’s coefficients are positive (b) polarization coefficients are not
and (c) as more emphasis is put on potential intergroup conflicts, the less significant the results. More-
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over, inequality, be it inter or intra-group seem to have a positive impact on the provision of public goods.
Why would only indices close to fractionalization be significant, while other measures of polariza-
tion are not? It should be kept in mind that the fractionalization index is closely and positively related
to the number of groups and is maximized at the uniform population distribution over these groups. On
the other hand, polarization decreases with the number of groups and is maximized when the population
is concentrated on two equally sized groups. According to the results from table 2, a larger number
of groups within a population is beneficial to the provision of public goods while intergroup inequality
or antagonisms seem to play no role. On the other hand the presence of wealthy individuals is benefi-
cial to the provision of public goods and so is intra group inequality. All these elements suggest that
may be some patronage activities taking place. Wealthy individuals may support the costs of having the
goods brought to their village and provide their poorer caste members with access to them. If every caste
"leader" does the same for their caste affiliates, the larger the number of castes the more likely is the good
to be provided. This is in very rough terms what might happen in the event of patronage. To investigate
the occurrence of such a phenomenon we will present the results from the estimations of the patronage
model.
4.3 The Patronage Model
The patronage model will be applied only to the case of the Backward Agricultural Caste ("BAC") for
two reasons. First, together with the upper castes they are the dominant castes for the bulk of the sample.
BAC castes members own the largest share of land in 31% villages present in the sample. Second, being
an upper castes perfectly predicts attending schools or having access to electricity. This lack of variation
prevents from analyzing upper caste potential patronage.
Table 6-A sets out the result from the estimation of equation (2) testing for the distance to schools and
anganwadi centers. Being a BAC household does not significantly impact the probability to live less than
500m away from public primary schools and anganwadi centers but does negatively impact the distance
to middle schools. However, living in BAC dominated village significantly increases the likelihood for
a BAC household to live close to the schools and more than 500m away from the anganwadi centers.
This last effect is explained by the fact that anganwadi centers are intended for deprived population and
is partly compensated by the fact that these centers are significantly more likely to be present in BAC
dominated areas. The increase in the probability for BAC households to live close to schools is not
driven by the fact that these villages are more likely to have these facilities present. Indeed the coef-
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ficients associated with the dummy for BAC dominated villages is significant but negative for the case
of public primary schools and insignificant for middle schools. Wealth plays no role in the distance to
the facilities, be it in BAC dominated villages or for BAC households. Please note that the difference
in the coefficients associated with the BAC caste and the interacted term is significant but for the public
primary schools, as reported at the bottom of the table.
Table 6-b presents the results from the estimation of the same equation except that the dependent variable
does now represent direct access to the facilities provided that they are available in the village. Belong-
ing to a BAC caste significantly reduces the likelihood of having toilets or of sending young children to
anganwadi centers and has no effect on having electricity, except when the household lives in a village
where the dominant caste is BAC. Indeed, in such a case, the likelihood of having toilets or of attend-
ing anganwadi centers turns from negative to positive and is nearly significant for the case of toilets.
Similarly it positively impacts the probability of having access to electricity for domestic use and the co-
efficient is very close to the 10% level of significance (p-value equals to 10.4%), although the difference
in the coefficients associated with the dummy and its interacted term is not significant as reported at the
bottom of the table. However being a BAC household in a BAC dominated village does not significantly
raise the likelihood of sending children to public primary school, even though the positive coefficient is
not far from the 10% level of significance and the difference in the coefficients is also close to signifi-
cance. These results are not driven by the fact that BAC dominated villages are more likely to have the
facilities present. Coefficients for this dummy are all negative and insignificant. More surprising are the
results obtained for middle school attendance. Being from a BAC caste increases the likelihood to attend
middle school except when the village is dominated by this caste. One explanation may be put forward.
Recall that the dominant caste is the one that owns the largest share of land. BAC caste households living
in a BAC dominated village derive a relatively large income from land cultivation and returns to middle
school education may be misvalued.
This evidence support the idea that members of the BAC caste enjoy a better access to public goods
when their caste is dominant although results are more mixed as far as school attendance is concerned.
Although BAC households tend to live closer to the facilities when they dominate, they do not signifi-
cantly attend schools more often. These results point towards the idea that there are some form of caste
patronage activities that do impact access to public goods. As argued earlier, this caste patronage may
help explain why social fractionalization indices exhibit a positive significant influence on the presence
of public goods, when polarization indices did not. Interestingly, patronage seems to be not so present
in school attendance, as tables 6 have shown, while the fractionalization’s coefficients were negative for
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these goods.
5 Conclusion
Social fractionalization has been found to have a positive effect on the provision of public goods at
the micro level, while most of the previous empirical research attributed a negative effect looking at
aggregated data. Polarization indices, which, arguably should do a better work at capturing potential
social antagonisms that hinder the implementation of public goods are found irrelevant. One of the
most plausible explanations for the fact that fractionalization is relevant while polarization is not is the
presence of castes patronage. Indeed fractionalization is highly linked with the number of groups while
polarization is more concerned with potential antagonisms. Therefore the larger the number of groups
the higher the probability for a village to have access to public goods, while social antagonisms are not
part of the story. The suspicion about patronage is reinforced by the positive impact on the provision of
public goods of the presence of very wealthy individuals, in accordance with the Olson’s effect, and by
the fact that of all forms of inequality, within group inequality is the most relevant. It has been showed
that access to some public goods is facilitated by belonging to the village’s wealthiest caste. This result
as well points towards the presence of caste patronage.
These results emphasize the need to look at local conditions and at the use which is made of public
goods instead of focusing only at the provision level. Since universal access to public goods is the
cornerstone of many development programs, policy makers should also remain vigilant that publicly
provided goods do not become "privatized".
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LIST OF VARIABLES AND SUMMARY STATISTICS AT THE VILLAGE LEVEL
Variables Description NB obs Mean sd
Paved Road Dummy =1 if the road to the village is paved 119 0.54 0.5
Bus stations Dummy=1 if the village is served by bus 119 0.17 0.38
Waste diposal Dummy=1 if there is a waste diposal 119 0.24 0.43
system in the village (open drain)
Telephone Dummy=1 if there is a telephone in the village 119 0.24 0.43
Electricity Dummy=1 if the village is electrified 119 0.53 0.5
Anganwadi center Dummy=1 if there is an anganwadi center in the village 114 0.32 0.47
Pub. Prim. School Dummy=1 if there is a public primary school in the village 119 0.79 0.41
Middle School Dummy=1 if there is a middle school in the village 119 0.25 0.44
PRQ α = 0 Equivalent to fractionalization index 120 0.60 0.17
α = 0.8 Medium polarization. Does not account 120 0.23 0.06
for intergroup wealth inequality
α = 1.6 High polarization. Does not account 120 0.1 0.03
for intergroup wealth inequality
P ∗ α = 0 Equivalent to a intergroup Gini coefficient 113 0.57 0.34
α = 0.8 Medium polarization accounting for 113 0.22 0.12
intergroup inequality
α = 1.6 High polarization accounting for 113 0.11 0.06
intergroup inequality
Theil Theil measure of general inequality 113 0.89 2.88
Between group inequality Please refer to definition in 3.2 113 0.24 0.27
Within group inequality Please refer to definition in 3.2 113 0.64 2.87
Rich Largest land value in the village divided 113 6.60 7.94
by the average land value in the village
excluding the largest from the average
Bac dominant Dummy variable =1 if Bac caste owns 118 0.31 0.45
the largest share of land.
avg household’s income Average households yeraly income 120 10 012.26 6 613.19
Number of hhlds Number of households in the village 114 227.07 137.89
avg size of hhlds Average size of households 120 6.28 1.18
Nb of sponsored programs Number of sponsored programs in 120 1.27 0.73
the last 12 months in the village
Nb of completed govt NB of completed government programs 120 0.63 1.01
programs in the last 12 months in the village
pctownfarm % of village households whose primary 120 0.45 0.19
source of living is their own farm
pct of illiterate hhlds heads % of village households whose head is illiterate 120 0.51 0.17
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LIST OF VARIABLES AND SUMMARY STATISTICS AT THE HOUSEHOLD LEVEL
Variables Description NB obs Mean sd
hh is bac caste Dummy = 1 if the household belongs to 2254 0.28 0.44
a backward agricultural caste
Rs value of land owned Money value of the land owned by the 1671 216 173.40 508 550.10
household as declared by the interviewee
hhld head is illiterate Dummy = 1 if the household head is illiterate 2256 0.51 0.50
Size of household Number of individuals living in the household 2255 6.30 3.18
Age of hhld heads Age of the household’s head 2256 46.7 14.15
distance < 500m to Pub. Prim. Dummy=1 if the household lives less than 500m 2252 0.67 0.47
School away from a public primary school
Middle School Dummy=1 if the household lives less than 500m 2252 0.18 0.38
away from a middle school
Anganwadi Dummy=1 if the household lives less than 500m 2252 0.26 0.44
center away from an anganwadi center
Toilets dummy=1 if the house is equipped with toilets 553 0.13 0.33
provided a waste disposal system exists in the village
Elelctricity Dummy=1 if the house is connected to the 1197 0.17 0.38
electricity network of the village
Attended anganwadi Dummy=1 if children in the household have attended 420 0.10 0.30
anganwadi center provided they are of appropriate
age and provided the center is present in the village
Attended Pub. Prim. School Similar to anganwadi centers 841 0.94 0.23
Attended Middle School Similar to anganwadi centers 283 0.54 0.50
23
 
Document de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2010.26
TA
B
L
E
1
:
B
A
S
IC
S
P
E
C
IF
IC
A
T
IO
N
W
IT
H
F
R
A
C
T
IO
N
A
L
IZ
A
T
IO
N
M
E
A
S
U
R
E
Pa
ve
d
R
oa
d
B
us
st
at
io
n
W
as
te
D
is
po
sa
l
Te
le
ph
on
e
E
le
ct
ri
ci
ty
A
ng
an
w
ad
i
Pu
b.
Pr
im
.
M
id
dl
e
Sy
st
em
ce
nt
er
Sc
ho
ol
Sc
ho
ol
Fr
ac
tio
na
liz
at
io
n
2.
18
7*
**
0.
85
1
2.
57
1*
*
2.
26
7*
**
0.
31
0
1.
48
1*
*
-1
.7
01
*
0.
44
5
(P
Q
R
α
=
0
)
(0
.0
02
)
(0
.4
97
)
(0
.0
40
)
(0
.0
08
)
(0
.6
81
)
(0
.0
47
)
(0
.0
76
)
(0
.5
91
)
av
g.
ho
us
eh
ol
ds
’
-0
.0
00
0.
00
0
-0
.0
00
**
*
-0
.0
00
0.
00
0
-0
.0
00
-0
.0
00
*
-0
.0
00
in
co
m
e
(0
.2
34
)
(0
.5
61
)
(0
.0
04
)
(0
.7
54
)
(0
.1
38
)
(0
.1
10
)
(0
.0
65
)
(0
.6
94
)
N
um
be
r
of
hh
ld
s
0.
00
0
0.
00
2*
*
0.
00
2
0.
00
1
0.
00
1
0.
00
1*
0.
00
7*
**
0.
00
4*
**
(0
.9
66
)
(0
.0
29
)
(0
.1
27
)
(0
.2
54
)
(0
.2
39
)
(0
.0
94
)
(0
.0
00
)
(0
.0
00
)
av
g.
si
ze
of
hh
ld
s
-0
.0
66
-0
.2
28
0.
35
8*
*
-0
.1
88
-0
.1
32
0.
11
7
0.
08
1
0.
06
8
(0
.6
45
)
(0
.1
97
)
(0
.0
41
)
(0
.2
21
)
(0
.3
70
)
(0
.4
23
)
(0
.6
33
)
(0
.6
74
)
N
b
of
sp
on
so
re
d
0.
02
5
-0
.4
23
-0
.3
16
0.
36
6*
0.
30
0*
0.
09
4
0.
01
0
0.
41
2*
*
pr
og
ra
m
s
(0
.9
01
)
(0
.1
07
)
(0
.3
21
)
(0
.0
79
)
(0
.0
92
)
(0
.6
41
)
(0
.9
72
)
(0
.0
31
)
N
b
of
co
m
pl
et
ed
0.
27
1*
*
0.
46
1*
*
-0
.3
85
*
-0
.3
42
*
0.
11
5
0.
46
0*
**
0.
09
5
0.
07
1
go
vt
pr
og
ra
m
s
(0
.0
42
)
(0
.0
13
)
(0
.0
58
)
(0
.0
76
)
(0
.4
53
)
(0
.0
09
)
(0
.6
03
)
(0
.6
35
)
pc
t.
hh
ld
s.
w
ho
se
m
ai
n
so
ur
ce
of
-1
.4
84
**
-2
.4
40
**
*
-0
.2
77
-1
.4
09
*
-0
.7
00
-0
.5
12
-0
.0
92
-0
.5
54
liv
in
g
is
ow
n
fa
rm
(0
.0
34
)
(0
.0
08
)
(0
.7
01
)
(0
.0
73
)
(0
.3
15
)
(0
.4
77
)
(0
.9
13
)
(0
.4
95
)
pc
to
fi
lli
te
ra
te
-1
.2
10
-1
.9
21
*
-1
.1
89
-2
.1
74
**
-2
.3
42
**
*
-1
.2
90
-0
.4
29
-2
.3
47
**
*
hh
ld
sh
ea
ds
(0
.1
32
)
(0
.0
60
)
(0
.2
79
)
(0
.0
11
)
(0
.0
06
)
(0
.1
24
)
(0
.6
83
)
(0
.0
10
)
C
on
st
an
t
0.
56
6
1.
31
0
-2
.6
76
*
0.
15
9
1.
16
4
-1
.5
23
0.
59
6
-1
.3
40
(0
.6
28
)
(0
.3
38
)
(0
.0
72
)
(0
.9
00
)
(0
.3
56
)
(0
.2
04
)
(0
.6
88
)
(0
.2
72
)
O
bs
er
va
tio
ns
11
5
11
5
11
5
11
5
11
5
11
0
11
5
11
5
W
al
d
χ
2
20
.4
19
36
.3
07
29
.8
49
25
.5
20
17
.3
99
17
.8
31
18
.3
05
24
.0
63
Ps
eu
do
R
2
0.
11
7
0.
24
0
0.
22
2
0.
16
2
0.
11
0
0.
13
5
0.
20
1
0.
20
0
R
ob
us
tp
va
lu
es
in
pa
re
nt
he
se
s;
*
si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
at
10
%
;*
*
si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
at
5%
;*
**
si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
at
1%
24
 
Document de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2010.26
TA
B
L
E
2:
C
O
E
FF
IC
IE
N
T
S
F
O
R
T
H
E
V
A
R
IO
U
S
P
O
L
A
R
IZ
A
T
IO
N
’S
M
E
A
S
U
R
E
S
Pa
ve
d
R
oa
d
B
us
st
at
io
n
W
as
te
D
is
po
sa
l
Te
le
ph
on
e
E
le
ct
ri
ci
ty
A
ng
an
w
ad
i
Pu
b.
Pr
im
.
M
id
dl
e
Sy
st
em
ce
nt
er
s
Sc
ho
ol
Sc
ho
ol
P
R
Q
α
=
0
2.
18
7*
**
0.
85
1
2.
57
1*
*
2.
26
7*
**
0.
31
0
1.
48
1*
*
-1
.7
01
*
0.
44
5
(0
.0
02
)
(0
.4
97
)
(0
.0
40
)
(0
.0
08
)
(0
.6
81
)
(0
.0
47
)
(0
.0
76
)
(0
.5
91
)
P
R
Q
α
=
0.
8
5.
55
2*
**
0.
42
8
2.
44
8
7.
09
6*
*
-0
.1
81
6.
93
8*
*
-4
.6
54
*
1.
64
6
(0
.0
09
)
(0
.9
06
)
(0
.2
50
)
(0
.0
13
)
(0
.9
39
)
(0
.0
26
)
(0
.0
98
)
(0
.5
34
)
P
R
Q
α
=
1.
6
3.
68
4
-3
.0
05
-4
.5
84
3.
05
9
-2
.6
93
6.
34
8
-4
.8
43
6.
24
3
(0
.3
56
)
(0
.6
19
)
(0
.2
73
)
(0
.4
88
)
(0
.5
35
)
(0
.1
81
)
(0
.2
87
)
(0
.2
08
)
P
∗
α
=
0
0.
33
1
0.
48
8
-0
.0
52
0.
68
4
-0
.2
17
0.
76
4*
0.
02
6
0.
38
1
(0
.3
50
)
(0
.3
82
)
(0
.9
05
)
(0
.1
13
)
(0
.5
46
)
(0
.0
79
)
(0
.9
51
)
(0
.3
33
)
P
∗
α
=
0.
8
-0
.2
02
0.
44
6
-1
.3
47
1.
91
6
-0
.9
57
2.
02
9*
-0
.3
61
1.
52
2
(0
.8
46
)
(0
.7
90
)
(0
.2
95
)
(0
.1
12
)
(0
.3
57
)
(0
.0
84
)
(0
.7
63
)
(0
.2
18
)
P
∗
α
=
1.
6
-2
.5
98
-3
.0
70
-5
.5
98
**
3.
38
0
-2
.2
90
2.
82
8
-1
.8
10
3.
66
9
(0
.2
10
)
(0
.3
97
)
(0
.0
47
)
(0
.1
43
)
(0
.2
64
)
(0
.1
99
)
(0
.4
50
)
(0
.1
32
)
R
ob
us
tp
va
lu
es
in
pa
re
nt
he
se
s
*
si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
at
10
%
;*
*
si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
at
5%
;*
**
si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
at
1%
25
 
Document de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2010.26
TABLES 3-A : POLARIZATION INDICES WITH THE THEIL INDEX
PRQ indices
Paved Road Bus Waste Disposal Telephone
PRQ 1.872** -0.487 2.262* 1.456
α = 0 (0.032) (0.751) (0.087) (0.147)
PRQ 3.528 -5.751* 0.875 5.883
α = 0.8 (0.165) (0.074) (0.748) (0.134)
PRQ -0.755 -10.338 -7.717 2.028
α = 1.6 (0.864) (0.116) (0.127) (0.715)
Theil -0.018 -0.003 0 0.02 0.023 0.003 -0.016 0.002 -0.005 0.068* 0.077** 0.082**
index (0.678) (0.944) (0.995) (0.471) (0.383) (0.902) (0.692) (0.956) (0.912) (0.063) (0.025) (0.017)
Obs. 109 109 109 110 110 110 109 109 109 110 110 110
Wald χ2 16.151 13.645 12.038 36.337 33.401 35.901 29.171 28.568 28.646 23.476 21.995 20.336
Pseudo R2 0.1 0.081 0.072 0.239 0.256 0.258 0.231 0.2 0.214 0.175 0.178 0.162
Robust p values in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Electricity Anganwadi centers Pub. Prim. School Middle School
PRQ 0 2.095** -2.083* -0.224
α = 0 (1.000) (0.029) (0.061) (0.799)
PRQ -1.081 6.123* -4.345 -0.352
α = 0.8 (0.679) (0.061) (0.154) (0.898)
PRQ -2.764 3.184 -2.677 4.594
α = 1.6 (0.556) (0.520) (0.610) (0.374)
Theil 0.203** 0.211** 0.195** -0.506 -0.288 -0.189 0.214 0.131 0.111 0.02 0.017 0.023
index (0.025) (0.022) (0.026) (0.147) (0.371) (0.409) (0.390) (0.284) (0.277) (0.617) (0.656) (0.555)
Obs. 109 109 109 106 106 106 110 110 110 110 110 110
Wald χ2 22.928 22.485 23.507 18.566 16.44 14.974 19.58 18.046 17.279 22.905 22.975 23.151
Pseudo R2 0.157 0.158 0.159 0.159 0.153 0.138 0.222 0.202 0.187 0.193 0.192 0.197
Robust p values in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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TABLES 3-B : POLARIZATION INDICES WITH THE THEIL INDEX
P ∗ INDICES
Paved Road Bus Waste Disposal Telephone
P ∗ 0.303 0.481 -0.078 0.599
α = 0 (0.394) (0.394) (0.861) (0.175)
P ∗ -0.235 0.42 -1.386 1.79
α = 0.8 (0.822) (0.803) (0.287) (0.151)
P ∗ -2.577 -3.118 -5.569** 3.425
α = 1.6 (0.214) (0.395) (0.049) (0.149)
Theil -0.004 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.013 0.02 0.004 0.007 0.005 0.072** 0.075** 0.080**
index (0.921) (0.977) (0.967) (0.933) (0.598) (0.443) (0.924) (0.872) (0.910) (0.039) (0.027) (0.017)
Obs. 109 109 109 110 110 110 109 109 109 110 110 110
Wald χ2 12.649 12 13.826 40.349 37.195 35.319 28.661 30.245 29.34 20.575 21.125 20.206
Pseudo R2 0.075 0.072 0.081 0.248 0.238 0.247 0.2 0.208 0.228 0.176 0.177 0.176
Robust p values in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Electricity Anganwadi Centers Pub. Prim School Middle School
P ∗ -0.483 2.280*** -0.083 0.471
α = 0 (0.250) (0.001) (0.848) (0.224)
P ∗ -1.471 3.818** -0.856 1.556
α = 0.8 (0.184) (0.012) (0.564) (0.197)
P ∗ -2.747 3.806 -2.072 3.316
α = 1.6 (0.190) (0.110) (0.383) (0.162)
Theil 0.326 0.294* 0.241* -1.874*** -0.996** -0.465 0.135 0.352 0.15 0.008 0.011 0.016
index (0.112) (0.085) (0.056) (0.008) (0.034) (0.216) (0.274) (0.546) (0.403) (0.841) (0.783) (0.692)
Obs. 109 109 109 106 106 106 110 108 110 110 110 110
Wald χ2 19.942 21.487 23.627 23.192 18.903 16.335 16.82 14.48 17.406 24.035 23.309 22.938
Pseudo R2 0.165 0.167 0.166 0.218 0.18 0.152 0.185 0.2088 0.191 0.201 0.203 0.204
Robust p values in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
27
 
Document de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2010.26
TABLES 4-A : POLARIZATION INDICES WITH INEQUALITY INDICATORS
PRQ INDICES
Paved Road Bus station Waste Disposal System Telephone
PRQ 1.923** -1.616 3.063** 0.852
α = 0 (0.043) (0.291) (0.037) -0.408
PRQ 3.35 -6.783** 1.025 4.973
α = 0.8 (0.187) (0.044) (0.699) (0.245)
PRQ -0.233 -8.241 -8.673* 4.065
α = 1.6 (0.959) (0.220) (0.093) (0.483)
Between group 0.082 0.391 0.49 1.110** 0.910* 0.565 -0.923 -0.273 -0.38 0.645 0.726 0.86
inequality (0.859) (0.349) (0.258) (0.035) (0.078) (0.250) (0.147) (0.598) (0.440) (0.248) (0.174) (0.111)
Within group -0.021 -0.009 -0.007 0.002 -0.002 -0.016 -0.018 0.003 -0.004 0.066* 0.070** 0.075**
inequality (0.622) (0.842) (0.878) (0.947) (0.934) (0.566) (0.659) (0.946) (0.925) (0.074) (0.047) (0.031)
Obs. 109 109 109 110 110 110 109 109 109 110 110 110
Wald χ2 15.826 13.367 12.329 41.98 40.231 42.925 35.437 30.821 31.358 21.675 20.974 19.659
Pseudo R2 0.098 0.08 0.072 0.272 0.284 0.27 0.251 0.206 0.223 0.174 0.181 0.173
Robust p values in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Electricity Anganwadi Centers Public Primary School Middle School
PRQ 0.367 2.105** -2.739** -0.826
α = 0 (0.681) (0.028) (0.023) (0.375)
PRQ -0.619 6.542** -4.766 -1.42
α = 0.8 (0.812) (0.043) (0.120) (0.596)
PRQ -3.507 4.271 -2.345 6.177
α = 1.6 (0.460) (0.417) (0.666) (0.290)
Between group -0.249 -0.146 -0.222 -0.14 0.152 0.302 1.166* 0.641 0.419 0.819* 0.677* 0.781*
inequality (0.573) (0.725) (0.597) (0.791) (0.768) (0.569) (0.092) (0.283) (0.457) (0.065) (0.092) (0.066)
Within group 0.31 0.319 0.321 -1.199* -1.097* -1.001 0.102** 0.083** 0.082* 0.013 0.007 0.013
inequality (0.118) (0.111) (0.142) (0.067) (0.092) (0.109) (0.035) (0.043) (0.067) (0.730) (0.851) (0.731)
Obs. 109 109 109 106 106 106 110 110 110 110 110 110
Wald χ2 20.709 19.589 20.493 21.688 18.161 16.129 20.538 19.725 18.716 24.631 24.86 24.315
Pseudo R2 0.16 0.16 0.163 0.168 0.164 0.149 0.238 0.206 0.188 0.205 0.202 0.207
Robust p values in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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TABLES 4-B : POLARIZATION INDICES WITH INEQUALITY INDICATORS
P ∗ INDICES
Paved Road Bus station Waste Disposal System Telephone
P ∗ 0.338 0.49 -0.065 0.62
α = 0 (0.338) (0.381) (0.883) (0.156)
P ∗ -0.182 0.445 -1.381 1.842
α = 0.8 (0.861) (0.790) (0.284) (0.138)
P ∗ -2.617 -3.085 -5.675** 3.512
α = 1.6 (0.208) (0.394) (0.045) (0.142)
Within group -0.007 -0.004 -0.006 -0.008 -0.008 -0.011 0.003 0.004 0.001 0.070** 0.072** 0.075**
inequality (0.871) (0.920) (0.897) (0.730) (0.732) (0.651) (0.940) (0.922) (0.979) (0.047) (0.036) (0.027)
Obs 109 109 109 110 110 110 109 109 109 110 110 110
Wald χ2 11.535 10.653 12.632 42.465 40.632 40.656 29.32 30.989 30.254 20.163 20.504 19.212
Pseudo R2 0.07 0.065 0.075 0.249 0.239 0.247 0.204 0.212 0.233 0.166 0.166 0.165
Robust p values in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Electricity Anganwadi Centers Public Primary School Middle School
P ∗ -0.213 0.818* 0.034 0.469
α = 0 (0.556) (0.071) (0.936) (0.225)
P ∗ -0.937 2.088* -0.327 1.51
α = 0.8 (0.368) (0.083) (0.784) (0.209)
P ∗ -2.216 2.625 -1.738 3.215
α = 1.6 (0.282) (0.244) (0.469) (0.175)
Within group 0.316* 0.309 0.297 -0.986* -1.008* -1.005 0.093* 0.094* 0.090* 0.005 0.008 0.012
inequality (0.098) (0.103) (0.112) (0.099) (0.096) (0.101) (0.086) (0.087) (0.083) (0.897) (0.841) (0.769)
Obs. 109 109 109 106 106 106 110 110 110 110 110 110
Wald χ2 19.793 20.227 21.286 17.922 17.111 16.423 17.765 18.116 18.756 23.4 22.72 22.359
Pseudo R2 0.161 0.163 0.165 0.172 0.165 0.153 0.181 0.182 0.186 0.198 0.2 0.201
Robust p values in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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TABLES 5 : POLARIZATION INDICES WITH THE RICH MEASURE
PRQ INDICES
Paved Road Bus Waste Disposal Telephone
PRQ 1.585* -0.726 2.425* 1.102
α = 0 (0.064) (0.617) (0.075) (0.268)
PRQ 3.162 -5.657* 1.017 4.809
α = 0.8 (0.209) (0.081) (0.716) (0.270)
PRQ -0.445 -8.58 -8.157 1.326
α = 1.6 (0.918) (0.206) (0.127) (0.807)
rich 0.027 0.031* 0.032* 0.027* 0.027* 0.023 -0.04 -0.029 -0.028 0.028 0.03 0.032*
(0.104) (0.058) (0.053) (0.071) (0.061) (0.114) (0.107) (0.158) (0.141) (0.135) (0.107) (0.088)
Theil index 0.917 1.033 1.142 -0.856 -0.727 -0.902 1.39 1.592 1.703 2.231* 2.197* 2.336*
(0.351) (0.295) (0.245) (0.408) (0.491) (0.374) (0.266) (0.198) (0.166) (0.067) (0.067) (0.054)
Obs 109 109 109 110 110 110 109 109 109 110 110 110
Wald χ2 22.978 19.727 17.791 39.025 35.325 38.395 31.234 29.583 32.413 23.874 23.504 22.227
Pseudo R2 0.121 0.109 0.101 0.27 0.284 0.28 0.272 0.239 0.253 0.188 0.191 0.181
Robust p values in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Electricity Anganwadi Pub. Prim. Middle
Centers School School
PRQ 0.435 1.766** -2.178** -1.01
α = 0 (0.603) (0.046) (0.048) (0.278)
PRQ -0.523 6.464** -4.739 -2.353
α = 0.8 (0.839) (0.048) (0.132) (0.407)
PRQ -4.073 3.984 -3.567 4.955
α = 1.6 (0.387) (0.433) (0.498) (0.401)
rich 0.008 0.01 0.008 -0.021* -0.016 -0.013 0.018 0.01 0.008 0.032** 0.030** 0.031**
(0.590) (0.501) (0.592) (0.085) (0.199) (0.301) (0.329) (0.513) (0.623) (0.013) (0.025) (0.014)
Theil index 0.095 0.196 0.204 0.017 0.076 0.173 4.126*** 3.892*** 3.783*** 2.264** 2.174* 2.041*
(0.921) (0.838) (0.832) (0.987) (0.942) (0.867) (0.004) (0.006) (0.008) (0.042) (0.050) (0.061)
Obs 109 109 109 106 106 106 110 110 110 110 110 110
Wald χ2 20.431 19.21 19.765 19.656 17.648 15.724 30.783 29.651 27.594 29.904 30.521 31.096
Pseudo R2 0.134 0.133 0.137 0.144 0.144 0.129 0.281 0.262 0.245 0.249 0.246 0.247
Robust p values in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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TABLE 6-A : PATRONAGE MODEL
DISTANCE TO SCHOOLS AND ANGANWADI CENTERS
Distance < 500m to
Public Primary School Middle School Anganwadi center
hh is bac caste 0.019 -0.347*** 0.055
(0.863) (0.005) (0.597)
hhld bac x bac dominant 0.395** 0.802*** -0.406**
(0.024) 0.000 (0.021)
Rs value of land owned 0 0.000** 0
(0.346) (0.024) (0.966)
land value x hhld bac 0 0 0
(0.697) (0.919) (0.478)
land value x bac dominant 0 0 0.000*
(0.604) (0.106) (0.088)
land x hhld bac x bac dominant 0 0 0
(0.136) (0.131) (0.368)
bac dominant caste -0.211** 0.156 0.222**
(0.031) (0.182) (0.027)
hhld head is illiterate -0.078 -0.194** -0.122*
(0.248) (0.012) (0.080)
size of household 0.004 -0.004 -0.018*
(0.670) (0.694) (0.073)
age of hhld’s heads 0.004* 0.004 0.005**
(0.092) (0.139) (0.030)
Constant 0.235* -1.091*** -0.740***
(0.072) 0.000 0.000
Observations 1644 1644 1644
Wald χ2 21.165 55.945 28.361
Pseudo R2 0.01 0.032 0.015
Coefficient equality test
Ho: γ1 = γ2
χ2 2.13 15.23 3.37
P > χ2 0.1442 0.0001 0.0663
Robust p values in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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TABLE 6-B : PATRONAGE MODEL
HOUSEHOLD’S ACCESS
Household has
Toilets Electricity Attended Attended Pub. Attended
Anganwadi Prim. School Middle School
hh is bac caste -0.568 0.044 -1.165** -0.301 1.137***
(0.102) (0.791) (0.017) (0.190) (0.006)
hhld bac x bac dominant 0.956 0.466 0.961 0.655 -1.273**
(0.101) (0.104) (0.162) (0.141) (0.024)
Rs value of land owned 0.000*** 0.000* 0 0 0.000**
(0.002) (0.080) (0.550) (0.631) (0.021)
land value x hhld bac 0 0 0.000* 0 -0.000**
(0.944) (0.183) (0.086) (0.631) (0.036)
land value x bac dominant 0 0.000*** 0 0 0
(0.531) (0.001) (0.947) (0.441) (0.665)
land x hhld bac x bac dominant 0 -0.000* 0 0 0
(0.599) (0.067) (0.448) (0.379) (0.415)
bac dominant caste -0.486 -0.303 -0.282 -0.153 0.391
(0.122) (0.115) (0.368) (0.596) (0.194)
hhld head is illiterate -0.590*** -0.586*** 0.177 -0.027 -0.581***
(0.003) 0.000 (0.364) (0.875) (0.007)
size of household 0.008 0.021 -0.001 0.043 -0.007
(0.742) (0.149) (0.981) (0.169) (0.831)
age of hhld’s heads 0.020*** 0.015*** -0.002 -0.007 0.018**
(0.002) 0.000 (0.793) (0.293) (0.026)
Constant -2.008*** -1.775*** -0.932*** 1.652*** -0.986**
0.000 0.000 (0.007) 0.000 (0.023)
Obs. 396 895 324 676 226
Wald χ2 57.006 100.956 10.052 5.811 50.802
Pseudo R2 0.163 0.117 0.042 0.019 0.166
Coefficient equality test
Ho: γ1 = γ2
χ2 3.3 1.07 3.79 2.56 7.04
P > χ2 0.0693 0.3021 0.0515 0.1097 0.008
Robust p values in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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TABLE 7: POLARIZATION MEASURES CORRELATIONS
PRQ P
∗ Theil bgi wgi
α = 0 α = 0.8 α = 1.6 α = 0 α = 0.8 α = 1.6
PRQ α = 0 1
α = 0.8 0.83*** 1
α = 1.6 0.24*** 0.71*** 1
P ∗ α = 0 0.54*** 0.37*** -0.0353 1
α = 0.8 0.42*** 0.46*** 0.21** 0.90*** 1
α = 1.6 0.20** 0.41*** 0.41*** 0.66*** 0.90*** 1
Theil 0.16* 0.04 -0.12 0.12 0.06 -0.01 1
Between group inequality 0.35*** 0.15 -0.13 0.90*** 0.74*** 0.52*** 0.1 1
Within group inequality 0.13 0.02 -0.11 0.03 -0.01 -0.06 0.99*** 0.01 1
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